This paper considers the role of state-contingent inflation as a fiscal shock absorber in an economy with nominal rigidities. I study the Ramsey equilibrium in a monetary model with distortionary taxation, nominal non-state-contingent debt, and sticky prices. With sticky prices, the Ramsey planner must balance the shock absorbing benefits of state-contingent inflation against the associated resource misallocation costs. For government spending processes resembling post-war experience, introducing sticky prices generates striking departures in optimal policy from the case with flexible prices. For even small degrees of price rigidity, optimal policy displays very little volatility in inflation. Tax rates and real government debt exhibit behavior similar to a random walk. For government spending processes resembling periods of intermittent war and peace, state-contingent inflation remains a valuable policy tool. As the variability in government spending increases, smoothing tax distortions across states of nature becomes increasingly important, and the shock absorber role of inflation is accentuated.
Introduction
An important result of the optimal policy literature is the prescription of policies which smooth tax distortions over time and across states of nature. When governments finance stochastic government spending by taxing labor income and issuing one-period debt, state-contingent returns on that debt allow tax rates to be roughly constant (see Lucas and Stokey, 1983; and Chari et al., 1991) . In monetary models, this tax smoothing can be achieved even when nominal returns on debt are not state-contingent; varying the price level in response to shocks allows the government to achieve appropriate statecontingent, ex-post real returns (see Chari et al., 1991) . Generating inflation in the period of a positive spending shock allows the government to decrease its real liabilities by reducing the value of its outstanding nominal claims. In this way, the government is able to attenuate the increase in taxes required to maintain present value budget balance. Similarly, a deflation in response to a negative spending shock attenuates the required fall in tax revenues. Clearly, inflation plays an important policy role when nominal returns to debt are not state-contingent, since it can generate real returns which are. Sims (2000) extends this analysis to address the debate on dollarization. In essence, replacing debt denominated in domestic currency with debt denominated in foreign currency eliminates the feasibility of state-contingent returns generated in this manner.
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A quantitative property of these models is that when calibrated to post-war US data, optimal policy displays extreme inflation volatility (see Chari et al., 1991; and Chari and Kehoe, 1999) . This is due to the fact that inflation is costless in these models. The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal degree of volatility when inflation is no longer costless, but still has shock absorbing benefits. This is an important consideration since studies that consider optimal monetary policy devoid of fiscal considerations prescribe stable inflation when nominal rigidities are present (see King and Wolman, 1999; Erceg et al., 2000; and Khan et al., 2000) . 2 To study this question I introduce sticky prices into the standard cash-credit good model. When some prices in the economy are set before the realization of government spending, unanticipated inflation causes relative price distortions. This distortion generates costly misallocation of real resources. Optimal policy 1 For discussion of these results in relation to the literature on the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, see Woodford (1998) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) . These papers, as well as Sims (2000) , leave as an open question the optimal degree of inflation volatility when inflation is costly. 2 Correia et al. (2002) characterize equilibria in a model of optimal fiscal and monetary policy with nominal rigidites in which the government is able to levy consumption taxes and issue state-contingent debt.
on the part of the government must balance the tax smoothing benefits of state-contingent inflation against these misallocation costs.
In examples calibrated to post-war US data, I show that this modification has a striking impact on the optimal degree of inflation volatility. While the flexible price model displays extreme volatility, the analogous sticky price model displays essentially stable deflation at the rate of time preference. This is true even when the proportion of sticky price setters is small. For instance, when 2% of price setting firms post prices before the realization of shocks, the standard deviation of inflation falls by a factor of 8 (relative to the case with flexible prices); when 5% of firms have sticky prices, the standard deviation falls by a factor of 16. When the model displays diminishing marginal product of labor, 5% sticky prices causes the standard deviation of inflation to fall by a factor of 40. Hence, for post-war calibrations, the gains from achieving state-contingency in real debt returns are small relative to the misallocation costs induced by variable ex-post inflation.
The nominal interest rate is no longer zero in the sticky price model, as prescribed by Friedman (1969) , but instead fluctuates across states of nature. However, the deviation from the Friedman Rule is quantitatively small. Finally, the serial correlation properties of optimal tax rates and real government debt differ markedly in the two environments. In contrast to Barro's (1979) random walk result, Chari et al. (1991) show that with flexible prices, these variables inherit the serial correlation of the model's underlying shocks (see Lucas and Stokey, 1983 , for the initial exposition of this with state-contingent debt). Faced with sticky prices, a benevolent government finances increased spending largely through increased taxes. As high spending regimes persist, tax revenues are gradually increased and real debt is accumulated. During spells of low spending, taxes fall and accumulated debt is paid off. As a result, the autocorrelations of these objects are near unity regardless of the persistence in the shock process, partially reviving Barro's result. This finding is similar to that of Aiyagari et al. (2001) who consider optimal policy in a model with incomplete markets. In fact, I show that the sequence of restrictions imposed on the set of feasible equilibria by sticky prices and market incompleteness are analytically similar.
As the volatility in government spending increases, however, the shock absorbing benefits of state-contingent inflation come to dominate the costs of resource misallocation. For instance, when government spending is 3 times more volatile than post-war experience, optimal policy prescribes extreme volatility in inflation, even with a large proportion of sticky prices. In these environments, tax smoothing considerations are accentuated, and the Ramsey planner tolerates misallocation in order to maintain state-contingency in debt returns generated through inflation. To shed light on this result, I present analysis that isolates the nature of the tax smoothing gains and misallocation costs as a function of the volatility in government spending.
The next section presents a cash-credit good model with price setting on the part of intermediate good firms; a subset of these firms post prices before the realization of the state of nature. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium, and develops the primal representation of equilibrium. I show that the primal representation requires consideration of two sequences of cross-state constraints not present with flexible prices. Section 4 presents the Ramsey allocation problem. The existence of the cross-state constraints makes solving this problem difficult. Section 5 discusses the characteristics of the Ramsey equilibrium that make development of a solution method feasible. I show that the solution builds upon the recursive contracts approach developed in Marcet and Marimon (1999) . Section 6 presents quantitative results for models calibrated to post-war data. Section 7 provides additional analysis of the key cross-state constraint introduced by sticky prices. Section 8 presents results for models with large government spending shocks. Section 9 concludes. 
The Model
). The initial state, s 0 , is given so that π (s 0 ) = 1.
Households
There is a large number of identical, infinitely-lived households in the economy. The representative household's objective function is:
The period utility function is of the form:
with σ, ψ > 0, φ < 1, and 0 < γ < 1. Here, l denotes the share of the household's unit time endowment devoted to labor, c 1 denotes units of consumption good purchased in cash, and c 2 denotes consumption purchased on credit. ) upon maturity at date t + 1. Note that the return on debt is non-state-contingent; that is, the return at date t is independent of the realization, s t .
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As a result, nominal wealth carried from state s t−1 to date t (the right-hand side of the inequality) is independent of the realization, s t , so that: 
. Purchases of the cash good are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint:
State s t purchases made in cash are settled at s t , while purchases made on credit are settled at the beginning of period t + 1.
This generates the standard first-order necessary conditions (FONCs) for the household:
Here and in the rest of the paper, U 1 = ∂U/∂c 1 (similarly for c 2 ), and U l = ∂U/∂l. Equation (7) states that the presence of a non-zero tax rate drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution in leisure-consumption and the real wage rate. Equation (8) states that a non-zero nominal interest rate drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution in cash-credit good consumption and the marginal rate of transformation, which equals unity (see equation (11) below). Equation (9) states the standard pricing formula for a risk-free nominal bond.
Final Good Firms
Firms in the final good sector transform intermediate goods into output according to:
where Y is final output and Y i is input purchased from intermediate good firm i. Final goods are transformed linearly into household and government consumption, so that:
Intermediate good firms have monopoly power over their particular good i. At the end of each period, before the realization of next period's shock, a fraction, v ∈ [0, 1], of these firms must post their prices for next period; these are the sticky price firms. Flexible price firms post prices after observing the shock. In a symmetric equilibrium:
where s stands for 'sticky' and f stands for 'flexible.'
The market for final goods is perfectly competitive and output is sold at the price P (s t ).
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The representative final good firm's problem is to choose inputs to maximize profits:
Technology displays constant returns to scale and equilibrium profits in this sector equal zero. Maximization produces the following FONCs:
when type s and f firms act symmetrically. In accordance with the information structure, the sticky price firm's price at state s
), is a function of the history s t−1 only, and is identical across realizations of s t ; as a result: 
Intermediate Good Firms
Each intermediate good firm i ∈ [0, 1] produces a differentiated product according to:
Labor is hired from a perfectly competitive labor market at the wage rate W . Considering α < 1 allows for an additional degree of curvature in studying the distortions due to asymmetry in prices and, consequently, asymmetry in labor allocations across flexible and sticky price firms.
Flexible Price Firms
After observing the current state, s t , the representative flexible price firm sets its price to maximize profit:
taking the final good firm's demand as given. The FONC for this problem:
states the familiar condition that labor is hired up to the point where the wage is equal to a fraction,
, of its marginal revenue product.
Sticky Price Firms
Before observing s t , the representative sticky price firm's problem is to choose a price, P s (s 
The term in square brackets is the firm's profit, Π s (s t ). The sticky price firm takes the marginal value of dividends, Q (s
, and the final good firm's demand as given. The FONC for this problem reads:
Government
), is determined exogenously and transits between g,ḡ with symmetric transition probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). The government purchases g (s t ) on credit, and faces a flow budget constraint:
This must be satisfied for all s t , through the appropriate choice of taxation, non-state-contingent debt issue, and inflation (via money creation) which induces ex-post variation in the real value of outstanding liabilities. 5 
Characterizing Equilibrium
An imperfectly competitive equilibrium, in which intermediate good firms of each type behave symmetrically, is defined in the usual way. 
)}, such that: 
• and R (s
The final condition ensures that the consumer does not find it profitable to buy money and sell bonds, so that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality.
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Bond market clearing at each state has been implicitly assumed, as both issues and holdings are denoted by the single variable, B (s t ); the same 5 Note that the role of inflation in generating fiscal state-contingency can be alleviated by availing the government of state-contingent debt, non-state-contingent debt with a sufficiently rich maturity structure (see Angeletos, 2000; and Buera and Nicolini, 2001 ), capital taxation (see Chari et al., 1991) , or consumption taxation (see Correia et al., 2002) . See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for further discussion. 6 When R s t = 1, the return to money and bonds are equal and the assets are redundant. To resolve this, I adopt the convention that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding in these states. Finally, note that it is initial real, as opposed to nominal, claims that are taken as given. This ensures that the initial price level, P (s 0 ), cannot be used by the government to generate zero real indebtedness or arbitrarily large revenues at date 0. As a result, P (s 0 ) is normalized to unity. This has the additional consequence of ensuring that P s (s
, so that the results across flexible and sticky price models are not driven simply by the treatment of date 0.
The Primal Approach
To simplify the analysis of optimal policy, I adopt the approach of characterizing equilibrium in primal form. This involves restating the equilibrium conditions in terms of real allocations alone. I show that the primal representation requires consideration of five constraints. The first two guarantee that R (s t ) ≥ 1 and that the final goods market clears:
These must hold ∀s t . Call these the no arbitrage and aggregate resource constraints.
The third constraint is:
where
is the utility value of the government's real budget surplus at s t (this is shown below), and Λ (s (26) is the standard implementability constraint modified to account for: (i) monopolistic competition in intermediate goods, and (ii) asymmetry between flexible and sticky price firms. The fourth constraint is a rewriting of the sticky price firm's FONC in terms of real allocations:
The final constraint is the sticky price constraint. This condition ensures that
is identical across realizations of s t+1 . Given that government spending takes on two possible values, g andḡ, this constraint is:
Proposition 2 In any symmetric, imperfectly competitive equilibrium, the allocation for consumption and labor, {c 1 (s
}, must satisfy the five constraints, (24) 
through (28). Furthermore, given sequences
} that satisfy these constraints, it is possible to construct all of the remaining equilibrium real allocation, price and policy variables.
The proof is contained in Appendix A. For the complete markets models studied previously in the literature, the primal form is characterized only by constraints (24) 
. This is true when governments are able to issue explicit state-contingent debt (see Lucas and Stokey, 1983), or when inflation acts costlessly to render nominal non-statecontingent debt state-contingent in real terms (see Chari et al., 1991 ; and Appendix B). In the face of stochastic shocks, tax distortions can be smoothed across states of nature in these models. However, price rigidity moves policy away from this complete markets result; the presence of sticky prices, and hence costly state-contingent inflation, adds the infinite sequence of cross-state constraints, (28) -one at each state, s
The implications of this for the nature of optimal tax smoothing are discussed in Section 7.
The Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey planner's problem is the following: find the fiscal and monetary policy that induces competitive equilibrium associated with the highest value of the household's expected lifetime utility. Call this equilibrium the Ramsey equilibrium. Specifically, the government commits to its chosen policy at the beginning of time; in all periods, maximizing agents behave taking this policy plan as given.
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In light of Proposition 2, solving for the Ramsey equilibrium is equivalent to finding the allocation {c 1 (s
} that maximizes the household's utility subject to the constraints (24) -(28). For future reference, let {δ (s
)}, and {ξ (s t )}, respectively, be the multipliers associated with these constraints in the Lagrange formulation of the problem. The two sequences of cross-state restrictions, (27) and (28), complicate the analysis relative to environments in which the implementability constraint provides the sole cross-state link. In particular, the entire infinite history of shocks, s ∞ , will matter for optimal period t decisions. Further details on the issues involved in solving this problem are presented in the following section.
Optimality of the Friedman Rule
In the rest of this section, I present results on the optimality of the Friedman Rule. In particular, for the class of utility functions (2), it is possible to show the following: Proof. There are 2 cases in which R (s
Proposition 3 For the imperfectly competitive, cash-credit good model with sticky prices, the Friedman Rule is not optimal; that is, R (s
is 'constrained optimal.' I first show that case (a) cannot hold at any s
is unconstrained optimal. Drop constraint (24) and equate the FONCs of the Lagrange problem equilibrium, with L f = L s . 9 For discussion of time consistency issues and the relationship to Stackelberg equilibrium see Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari et al. (1995) , and Woodford (1998) . (2) , this simplifies to: 
Since ξ (s Evidently, non-optimality of the Friedman Rule stems from the presence of sticky prices, and in particular, the sticky price constraint, (28), which restricts the set of feasible equilibria relative to the case with flexible prices. Further discussion of this is deferred to Section 7, where I consider the implications of the sticky price constraint on the Ramsey equilibrium. Also, note that this result differs from that emphasized in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a), who consider an imperfectly competitive monetary model with flexible prices. In their model, the Friedman Rule is not optimal -even without sticky prices -due to an assumption that profit income is untaxed. Indeed, if I modify the flexible price, cash-credit good economy studied in Appendix B so that profit income goes untaxed, the Friedman Rule breaks down as well. Further discussion of this result, as well as its relationship to the 'uniform commodity taxation rule' is contained in Appendix B.
A Recursive Solution Method
As shown in Appendix B, equilibrium in the flexible price model can be characterized as allocations that satisfy the constraints, (24) -(26). As a result, optimal consumption and labor allocations at state s t are stationary functions of only the current realization of government spending, g t , and the value of λ associated with the implementability constraint. This is due to the fact that the only cross-state effect of the allocation at s t is through its effect on the government's current (utility value of the) real budget surplus, C (s t ), in maintaining present value budget balance, (26). This makes the flexible price model particularly tractable, and exact solutions can be found easily (see Chari and Kehoe,1999 ; and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001a for discussion).
This stationarity result does not hold for the sticky price model, due to the presence of the additional cross-state constraints, (27) and (28). The appearance of future decision variables in the current sticky price constraint -in particular, the appearance of C (s To make the analysis tractable, I define the costate variable:
Since the initial state, s 0 , is given, κ (s t−1 ) = λ for t = 0, 1. Evidently, this variable summarizes the influence of C (s t ) on the implementability constraint as well as the sequence of sticky price constraints along the history leading to s t , and evolves according to the law of motion:
As discussed in Marcet and Marimon (1999) 
Note that for t ≥ 1, this function is defined recursively as:
This summarizes the impact of future decision variables upon decisions at the current state.
These definitions allow for a recursive representation of the Ramsey problem. Specifically, from inspection of the Ramsey planner's FONCs, optimal allocations for t ≥ 1 are stationary in the state (κ (s
). Accordingly, denote:
• (g t | g t−1 ) by Γ, where Γ ∈ g|g , ḡ|g , g|ḡ , (ḡ|ḡ) , and • κ (s ), where g −1 ∈ g,ḡ denotes the realization of government spending at date t − 1. Finally, the costate evolves according to:
Dependance of real variables (such as real debt holdings) and policy variables (such as tax rates) on κ imparts a persistent component to these objects. Chari et al. (1995) show that inference on the quantitative properties of policies and prices are sensitive to the choice of solution method. In particular, they find that non-linear approximations provide important accuracy improvements relative to linearization methods. Moreover, the presence of the occa-sionally binding constraint, R (s t ) ≥ 1, is problematic for standard linearization techniques. As a result, I develop a non-linear method to solve the Ramsey problem. The details of the solution algorithm are presented in Appendix C. Key to the technique is finding a non-linear approximation to the function:
which characterizes the Ramsey equilibrium. This is done using the projection methods described in Judd (1992a).
Quantitative Results for a Post-war Economy
In this section and in Section 8, I present results illustrating the quantitative properties of the Ramsey equilibrium with sticky prices. As a benchmark, I also present results for the analogous flexible price model.
Parameterization
The The value of µ is set to 1.05 which is somewhat smaller than that considered in other studies with sticky prices.
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This was chosen as a compromise between the sticky price literature, and the literature on optimal policy with flexible prices and perfect competition. As in previous studies of optimal policy, the value of labor's share of income, α, is initially set to unity. The steady-state ratio of government spending to GDP is 20%. The persistence parameter, ρ = 0.95, and the values ofḡ and g are chosen to match the autocorrelation and 6.7% standard deviation of annual US data from 1960 to 1999.
Initial real claims on the government are set so that in the stationary equilibrium of the flexible price model, the government's real debt to GDP ratio is 0.75. This is somewhat larger than the value considered in Chari et al. (1991) , and also larger than the ratio of privately held government debt to GDP observed in the US, which averaged 0.41 from 1960 to 1999, and 0.45 since the Reagan administration.
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However, choosing a 0 to match this statistic would underestimate the true value of nominal liabilities held against the government by the US private sector. For instance, Judd (1992b) argues that the stock of unused capital depreciation allowance incorporated in the tax code is valued at 25% to 33% of GDP.
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In addition, the real value of non-indexed government expenditures such as wage and transfer payments depends on the ex-post realization of inflation.
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The value chosen here is an estimate based on these considerations. Finally, for the sticky price model, results are presented with the fraction of sticky price firms set at 5%.
Volatility
Simulation results for the baseline flexible and sticky price models are reported as case (a) of Table 1 , where all rates are expressed as annual percentages. From Proposition 4, the Friedman Rule is optimal with flexible prices. With sticky prices, despite the breakdown of the Friedman Rule, optimal nominal interest rates are still close to zero. The value of the interest rate depends largely on the realization of government spending, Γ. When current spending is high, irrespective of the previous spending shock (or the value of the costate), the interest rate is constrained by the 0% lower bound. When current spending is low, the interest rate is positive. The interest rate has a mean of 0.20% in continuation states, g|g , and attains its largest values in transition states, g|ḡ , where the maximum simulated value is 3.57%.
More striking is the impact on the volatility of the income tax and inflation rates due to the introduction of sticky prices. When the fraction of sticky price firms increases from 0% to 5%, the standard deviation of the Ramsey tax rate increases by a factor of 17; the standard deviation of the inflation rate falls by a factor of 16. At 5% sticky prices, the volatility of inflation is remarkably small. If the inflation rate was normally distributed, ninety percent of observations would lie between −3.48% and −2.19%. The analogous interval for the flexible price model is bounded by −12.74% and 7.56%.
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The corresponding averages for the ratio of privately held federal government debt to GDP are 0.31 and 0.37. 12 See Judd (1992b) also for a discussion on the effects of unanticipated inflation on real tax liabilities due to the differential treatment of corporate and personal income tax liabilities. 13 To obtain a gauge on the value of these current liabilities, note that the ratio of government wages to GDP is approximately 0.10, and the corresponding ratio for Social Security payments is approximately 0.04. 14 During the completion this paper, I have learned of independent work by SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2001b) who present similar results in a model where costs of inflation are imposed as a quadratic cost of price adjustment. In fact, optimal inflation volatility is small even when the degree of price rigidity is less than that displayed in Table 1 . Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of the Ramsey inflation rate at various values of v. Notice that the volatility falls quickly as the fraction of sticky price firms increases. With 2% sticky prices, the standard deviation of inflation is only 0.66%, 8 times smaller than in the flexible price case.
The difference in inflation volatility is more dramatic with a greater degree of curvature in production. This is seen in case (b) of Table 1 , where α = 0.64. Evidently, the planner's incentive to reduce misallocation costs is strengthened; with sticky prices the standard deviation of the tax rate increases by a factor of 16 relative to the case with flexible prices, and the standard deviation of the inflation rate falls by a factor of 40. Hence, a benevolent government is faced with a strong incentive to eliminate the resource misallocation that arises from ex-post inflation, relative to the distortions due to variability in tax rates across states of nature. The final experiment in this subsection investigates the effect of a 0 on optimal inflation volatility. Figure 2 plots the standard deviation of the Ramsey inflation rate for various values of the real debt to output ratio for the flexible price (dashed lines) and sticky price (solid lines) models. As the liabilities base increases, the government is able to generate the same change in real claims with smaller variations in the price level (for further discussion see Sims, 2000) . As a result, the inflation volatility required to achieve cross-state tax smoothing in the flexible price model falls from a standard deviation of 8.90% to 2.72% as the debt to output ratio rises from 0.40 to 1.50. Hence, the extreme degree of inflation volatility found in Chari et al. (1991) with flexible prices is in part due to their parameterization of a 0 . With sticky prices, the result of essentially stable inflation is robust across values of a 0 .
Time Series Realizations
With a jump in spending, the government's present value of current and future real liabilities increases. With flexible prices, the government finances this principally through a large devaluation of its outstanding liabilities by generating an inflation. This is not true with sticky prices. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , where I display 25-period time series of simulated data generated from the baseline flexible price (dashed lines) and sticky price (solid lines) real debt to output ratio % standard deviation of inflation models.
In period 5, government spending transits from its low to high state; real spending falls at date 20. With flexible prices, the government responds contemporaneously to an increase in spending by generating a large inflation. In panel B, the inflation rate jumps from −3.93% at date 4 to 20.8% at date 5. This sharply reduces the real value of inherited liabilities, as seen in panel C. Real outstanding liabilities fall by 21% in the period of the shock, and a further 3% in the following period (when payment on date 5 spending is made) due principally to a reduction in real bond issues in period 5. This allows the government to keep the tax rate (panel D) essentially constant across low and high spending states. The tax rate increases only 0.14% in period 5. When spending falls in period 20, there is a deflation and the value of real liabilities rises. Again taxes move very little.
In the sticky price model, there is essentially no inflationary response to the spending shock. The inflation rate increases from −2.87% in period 4 to −2.43% in period 5, and again to −2.16% in period 6 when payment on the increased spending is due. As a result, there is a much smaller reduction in the real value of inherited liabilities, which falls by only 1.5% in period 5 and 2.1% in period 6. Instead, the government finances the spending shock largely through increased tax revenue and, as the high spending regime persists, through bond issue. Between periods 4 and 20, the tax rate increases 1.11%. During this time, real debt issue (not shown) increases by 14.4%. When government spending falls, tax revenues are lowered, and the government gradually pays down the accumulated debt (with a one period lag). Hence, with sticky prices optimal policy can be roughly characterized as smoothing tax distortions intertemporally; this is accomplished by issuing and retiring debt in response to fiscal shocks. The similarity of this policy to the prescription advocated by Barro (1979) is discussed below.
Persistence
With sticky prices, the serial correlation of the Ramsey tax rate exhibits a noticeable deviation from the case with flexible prices. With flexible prices, the simulated tax rate inherits the autocorrelation of government spending (see also Lucas and Stokey, 1983; and Chari et al., 1991) . In the sticky price model, the autocorrelation is much closer to unity. This is also true of real government debt. Figure 4 plots the autocorrelation of tax rates and real bond holdings for various values of the autocorrelation in government spending. For the flexible price model (dashed line) this relationship maps out the 45-degree line, due to the stationarity result discussed in Section 5; that is, since real variables at state s t vary only with the value of g t , the tax rate and bond holdings inherit the serial correlation of the shock process. With sticky prices (solid lines), the autocorrelation of these variables is near unity regardless of the autocorrelation in government spending. The dependance of the tax rate and bond holdings on the costate, κ, as well as the unit coefficient on its lagged value in the law of motion, (38), imparts a persistent component to these variables. In this sense, introducing price rigidity moves optimal policy towards Barro's (1979) random walk result. As in Aiyagari et al. (2001) , this behavior is driven by the introduction of a costate variable summarizing the history of cross-state constraints. In the present model, this costate summarizes the history of sticky price constraints, (28).
The Sticky Price Constraint
The introduction of sticky prices causes the optimality of the Friedman Rule to break down. As well, Ramsey tax rates and real bond holdings display a high degree of persistence, regardless of the persistence in the underlying shocks. Both of these features are better understood upon closer inspection of the sticky price constraint. This constraint requires that the expected present value of real government budget 
See Appendix D for the derivation. In the expression for PV (s t ), the first term in square brackets is the government's real primary budget surplus at s r , r ≥ t, adjusted for the timing on spending and tax income in the government's budget constraint, (22 ). This allows for some insight into the behavior of optimal nominal interest rates, tax rates and bond holdings.
First, consider a deviation from the Friedman Rule. Raising the nominal interest rate from zero has two first order effects on PV (s t ): it decreases the real value of the time-adjusted primary surplus and increases the real value of interest savings. Since the primary surplus is orders of magnitudes greater than interest savings, 16 an increase in the nominal rate decreases the present value of surpluses. Hence with sticky prices, the Ramsey planner uses a positive nominal interest rate during periods of low spending to decrease PV (s t ) and help satisfy the sticky price constraint. This alleviates the need to use state-contingent inflation which causes deviations ofÃ (s
Finally, the sticky price constraint can be interpreted as an approximation to the constraint found in the following model: a real barter economy (without money or sticky prices) in which the return on debt is non-state-contingent. This environment is exactly the one considered in Aiyagari et al. (2001), who partially revive the intertemporal tax smoothing result of Barro (1979) . When the model of Aiyagari et al. (2001) is simplified so that government spending takes on only two values, the sequence of constraints imposed by incomplete contingent claims markets is: 
. Hence, the restrictions on the set of feasible equilibria imposed by sticky prices and incomplete markets are approximately equivalent. In both environments, tax smoothing across states of nature is replaced with tax smoothing over time; this is manifested in the persistence properties of tax rates and real government debt. 
Quantitative Results for a War and Peace Economy
The results of Sections 6 and 7 can be interpreted as follows: for government spending processes resembling post-war experience, smoothing tax distortions over time represents, in welfare terms, a close substitute to smoothing tax distortions across states of nature. Comparing simulated utility between the baseline sticky price model (in which inflation volatility is near zero) and the flexible price model (in which state-contingent inflation is costless) confirms this; in order to make the household indifferent between the two economies, consumption in the sticky price model must be increased by only 0.21% in all periods. Hence, for small amounts of price stickiness, the Ramsey planner is willing to forego state-contingency obtained through inflation, in order to minimize allocation distortions.
However, when differences in government spending across states are magnified, the value of inflation as a state-contingent capital levy are accentuated. Figure  5 presents the optimal degree of inflation volatility as a function of v, for government spending with a 21% standard deviation (and all other parameters as in the baseline case). This represents variability in spending roughly 3 times that of post-war US experience, so that this calibration exercise can be loosely interpreted as representing periods of war and peace. As shown in Figure 5 , inflation remains volatile even when half of all firms have sticky prices. Over this range, optimal inflation volatility falls by only 14%. Hence, for sufficiently large spending shocks, tax smoothing considerations dominate and optimal policy prescribes extreme inflation volatility even when the fraction of sticky price firms is large. To better understand this, it is fruitful to look at the benefits and costs of state-contingent inflation in isolation.
First, consider the value of smoothing tax distortions across states of nature for increasingly volatile government spending processes. To do this, I compare welfare across Ramsey equilibria of the following: (i) the flexible price version of the model in Section 2, and (ii) a constrained version of the model in which inflation must be perfectly forecastable. In version (i), the planner has access to full state-contingent tax instruments, so that tax distortions are optimally smoothed across states; in version (ii), real debt returns are constrained to be non-state-contingent so that only intertemporal tax smoothing is possible, as in Aiyagari et al. (2001) . Note that in both environments, there are no relative price distortions so misallocation costs are explicitly ruled out. Figure  6 presents the constant percentage increase in consumption needed in the incomplete markets model to make households indifferent between cases (i) and (ii). This compensation is increasing and convex in the volatility of the shock process. Hence, as government spending shocks grow, the benefits of state-contingent inflation increase at an increasing rate. Now consider the cost of resource misallocation as a function of spending volatility. To do this, I calculate the value of foregone output due to relative price distortions.
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In particular, I calculate the optimal degree of labor misallocation in the model of Section 2 when the fraction of sticky price firms is arbitrarily small. Because this represents an infinitely small perturbation of the flexible price model, optimal policy prescribes extreme inflation volatility and a large degree of misallocation. Using this, I determine the percentage value of output lost to resource misallocation implied by the state-contingent inflation policy. Figure 7 displays the amount of foregone output as a function of the volatility in the shock process. Note that this output cost is increasing and concave. Moreover, for spending processes with standard deviation greater than 10%, the misallocation cost is essentially constant. Combining this qualitative feature with tax smoothing gains that are increasing and convex, it is not surprising that for environments with large shocks, tax smoothing considerations dominate.
Conclusion
This paper characterizes optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky price setting in intermediate goods markets. With sticky prices, a benevolent government must balance the shock absorbing benefits of state-contingent inflation against its resource misallocation costs.The results of this study illuminate two key results.
First, for government spending processes resembling post-war experience, introducing small amounts of price rigidity generates large departures from the case with flexible prices studied previously in the literature. With a small fraction of firms setting prices before the realization of shocks, the Ramsey solution prescribes essentially constant deflation. Hence, responses in the real value of inherited government liabilities are largely attenuated. Instead, tax distortions can essentially be characterized as being smoothed over time. Persistent spells of high spending are accompanied by increasing tax collection and the accumulation of debt; spells of low spending by falling taxes and the reduction of debt. This imparts a high degree of persistence in tax rates and real debt holdings, regardless of the persistence in the underlying shock process. In summary, the extreme volatility in optimal inflation rates described in the optimal policy literature, at least for post-war calibrated shocks, is sensitive to small departures from the assumption of flexible price setting.
However, in environments with sufficiently large government spending shocks, inflation volatility is retained as a key policy prescription, allowing tax distortions to be smoothed across states of nature. Ramsey policy tolerates resource misallocation in favor of the state-contingency in real returns that are generated by volatility in inflation. This is true even when the degree of price rigidity, and hence when misallocation costs, are large. The sensitivity of this result, and the implications for welfare experience associated with historical war episodes is still to be determined.
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Deriving (24) and (25) where n s
This is done by using (8), (9), (6), and the transversality condition on real bond holdings:
. Using (14) , (15), (19) , and (23):
Using (7) and substituting above obtains (26).
To get the sticky price firm's FONC in terms of real allocations, substitute in (7) to obtain:
Using the remaining production-side FONCs, and multiplying by For the sticky price constraint, first rewrite the household's date t + 1 budget constraint as: 
To obtain (28), substitute this into (A. ).
Given sequences {c 1 (s
} that satisfy (24) - (28), the remaining equilibrium variables are constructed as follows. Output and real balances at s t are given by Y (s
, respectively. The gross risk-free return is R (s
. Relative prices and the real wage are:
The tax rate is given by:
Real government debt at s t is given by equation (A.9). Finally, the gross rate of inflation between states s t+1 and s t is given in equation (A.6).
B The Flexible Price Model

B.1 Preliminaries
Here, I characterize competitive equilibrium for the cash-credit good model with flexible prices. The first set of equilibrium conditions are the household FONCs, the household's budget constraint, the cash-in-advance constraint, and the government's budget constraint; these are identical to those presented in Section 2. 
. The real wage rate is: 6) and the tax rate is:
Real bond holdings and the gross rate of inflation are given by: 9) respectively. This is the natural simplification of the primal form for the sticky price economy. In particular, without sticky prices, the constraint (28) is irrelevant.
) ≡ 0 in (27), this constraint holds trivially.
B.2 When is the Friedman Rule Optimal?
Given this result, it is easy to prove that the Friedman Rule is optimal in the flexible price model. 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (B.3), and χ = C 1 /U 1 = C 2 /U 2 . This last equality follows from the fact that preferences satisfy (2) . Therefore, it must be that U 1 (s
Therefore, the Friedman Rule is optimal.
Indeed, this result holds for a more general class of utility functions than specified in condition (2) . As long as preferences are homothetic in cash and credit good consumption, and weakly separable in leisure, optimality of the Friedman Rule is maintained (see Chari and Kehoe, 1999 , for Friedman Rule results in a variety of monetary, flexible price models).
Note also that this result depends crucially upon labor and profit income being taxed at the uniform rate, τ (s t ). If the model is modified so that the tax rate on profits is zero, the Friedman Rule is no longer optimal. To see this, modify the model in this manner and derive the primal representation. Equilibrium is characterized by the same no arbitrage and aggregate resource constraints, but the implementability constraint becomes:
(B.12)
Inspection of the Ramsey FONCs with this set of constraints reveals that the Friedman Rule is not optimal. In fact, in the Ramsey equilibrium,
, t ≥ 1, so that the nominal interest rate should be strictly positive.
To gain intuition, note that the implementability constraint and aggregate resource constraint of this modified economy are equivalent to those derived from a repeated sequence of static, real barter economies. This economy features: a production technology with a linear transformation frontier between c 1 and c 2 ; distinct consumption tax rates; no income taxes; and an untaxed endowment of c 2 which, in equilibrium, is equal to (1 − α/µ) l α . Because of the endowment, optimality requires U 1 > U 2 . Since the law of one price dictates that c 1 and c 2 are sold at a uniform price, the government levies a higher tax rate on c 1 to induce the optimum. In the context of the cash-credit good model, this is achieved through a positive nominal interest rate which acts as a tax on the cash good.
Hence, the fact that R (s t ) > 1 is optimal can be understood as an exception to the uniform commodity taxation rule. Despite preferences that are homothetic in c 1 and c 2 , and weakly separable in leisure, optimal consumption tax rates are not equal when there is an untaxed endowment of one good (see Chari and Kehoe, 1999 ). In the cash-credit good model, the presence of untaxed profit income acts as a wealth endowment denominated in the credit good, since profit is transformed into credit one-for-one.
C The Solution Algorithm
A solution is characterized as a function, q : K × G → R, satisfying:
Given q (·) that solves the function, (C.1), the optimal allocations for consumption and labor are determined as those that solve the Ramsey planner's FONCs. These are presented below.
I proceed by approximating the present value function, q (κ, Γ), as a linear combination of Chebychev polynomials:
where, T n (·) is the n-th order Chebychev polynomial. In (C.3), k ≡ ϕ (log (κ)) and ϕ (·) is a linear function mapping the domain of the logged costate, [log (κ) , log (κ)], into the interval [−1, +1].
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Conceptually, it would be equally valid to define k ≡ ϕ (κ); in practice, defining the Chebychev polynomials as functions of the logged costate provides an easy degree of 'curvature' in the approximation function, facilitating accuracy for small N (see Christiano and Fisher, 2000 , for additional discussion).
The goal is to find an approximation which makes the residual function, R (κ, Γ;q N ), 'small' over the space K × G. The projection method I employ choosesq N (·) to solve the system of equations:
Here, the weighting functions are chosen as: are the roots of the M -th order polynomial, T M (k). Before proceeding to the implementation, note that the Gauss-Chebychev quadrature approximation in (C.7) can be written in matrix form as requiring X R k, Γ;q N = 0 for each Γ ∈ G, where:
. . . . . . . . . . . . 8) cause any problems as long as the set [log (κ) , log (κ)] is chosen to be sufficiently large, ensuring that the bounds are respected in simulation exercises. In what follows, I present an iterative algorithm which capitalize on this linearity, as well as the linear structure of the approximation function,q N (·). The algorithm proceeds in the following steps. Adjust the value of λ until this expression holds with equality.
D Derivations of Cross-State Constraints
D.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. 
